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Abstract—Studies show that neural networks, not unlike tra-
ditional programs, are subject to bugs, e.g., adversarial samples
that cause classification errors and discriminatory instances that
demonstrate the lack of fairness. Given that neural networks are
increasingly applied in critical applications (e.g., self-driving cars,
face recognition systems and personal credit rating systems), it
is desirable that systematic methods are developed to verify or
falsify neural networks against desirable properties. Recently,
a number of approaches have been developed to verify neural
networks. These efforts are however scattered (i.e., each approach
tackles some restricted classes of neural networks against certain
particular properties), incomparable (i.e., each approach has its
own assumptions and input format) and thus hard to apply, reuse
or extend. In this project, we aim to build a unified framework for
developing verification techniques for neural networks. Towards
this goal, we develop a platform called SOCRATES which supports
a standardized format for a variety of neural network models,
an assertion language for property specification as well as
two novel algorithms for verifying or falsifying neural network
models. SOCRATES is extensible and thus existing approaches
can be easily integrated. Experiment results show that our
platform offers better or comparable performance to state-of-
the-art approaches. More importantly, it provides a platform for
synergistic research on neural network verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural network models are getting ever more popular due
to their exceptional performance in solving many real-world
problems, such as self-driving cars [1], face recognition [2],
malware detection [3], sentiment analysis [4] and machine
translation [5]. At the same time, neural networks are shown
to be vulnerable to a variety of issues. For instance, it is
shown that adversarial perturbation can be applied to generate
samples which trigger wrong model prediction [6], [7], [8];
and it is shown that neural network models may discriminate
certain groups or individuals [9]. Given that neural networks
are increasingly applied in applications which are safety-
critical (e.g., self-driving cars) or have significant societal
impact (e.g., personal credit rating systems or face recog-
nition), it is desirable that such neural network models are
systematically verified against a variety of desirable properties.
For instance, an image recognition neural network model used
in a self-driving car should be verified to be robust (i.e.,
the classification result remains the same in the presence of
perturbation) and a neural network for predicting personal
credit rating should be verified to be fair.
Recently, there has been an increasing number of efforts on
formally verifying neural network models. In [10], Katz et al.
proposed a constraint solving technique targeting feedforward
neural networks with ReLU activation functions. In [11], [12],
Wang et al. improved the constraint solving techniques for
verifying the same class of neural networks with symbolic
intervals. In [13], [14], [15], the authors applied the classic
abstract interpretation techniques to verify neural networks,
with customized abstraction domains and functions supporting
feedforward neural networks with activation functions such as
ReLU, Sigmoid and Tanh.
The status quo is however less than satisfactory, i.e., existing
approaches are limited in multiple ways, which makes apply-
ing, comparing, reusing and extending existing verification ef-
forts difficult. First, existing approaches support only restricted
classes of neural networks or properties. For instance, some
existing work [10], [12] only support verification of feedfor-
ward neural networks using ReLU activation functions. Only
very recently, researchers have started exploring the verifica-
tion of feedforward neural networks with different activation
functions [14], [15] and some subclasses of recurrent neural
networks [16], [17]. Furthermore, existing approaches all focus
on reachability properties or local robustness, and ignores the
verification of other important properties such as fairness and
beyond. Secondly, existing verification toolkits require input
models in specific format and different tools often require
different format. For instance, Reluplex [10] requires a text
file contains the weights and bias of multilayer perceptron
layers, whereas DeepPoly [15] needs a more complex input
which specifies the types of layers before providing their
parameters’ values. This will likely get worse as there are
an increasing list of popular frameworks for training neural
network models, such as TensorFlow, Cafe, MXNet, PyTorch,
Theano and Keras, all of which encode neural network models
in their own ways. As a result, a verification tool developed for
one framework may not be applicable to models trained using
another. This not only limits the applicability of the existing
verification toolkits but also makes comparing them infeasible.
We remark that two recent efforts on solving this problem are
ONNX [18] and NNEF [19], which aims to provide a cross-
platform format for neural networks. It is however designed
for a different purpose and lacks important features which are
required for neural network verification. Thirdly, each existing
approach typically focuses on one property, whereas in fact
the (sometimes rather sophisticated) verification algorithm
could be easily extended to solve the verification problem of
another property. For instance, algorithms for verifying local
robustness can easily be extended to verify fairness defined in
terms of individual discrimination. With different verification
algorithms and optimization techniques implemented in differ-
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ent repositories, reusing these efforts is often highly nontrivial.
In this project, we aim to build a unified framework for
developing verification techniques for neural networks. The
goal is to have a platform which allows us to apply, compare,
reuse and develop verification techniques for a variety of
neural network models against a variety of properties. Towards
this goal, we design and implement an open source platform
called SOCRATES, which embodies multiple technical con-
tributions. First, SOCRATES provides a standardized format
for a variety of neural network models based on JSON. By
compiling models trained using different frameworks to this
common format and building verification algorithms around
it, the same verification algorithm can be applied to models
trained using different frameworks. Secondly, SOCRATES sup-
ports an assertion language which is designed to specify
a range of properties of neural network models, including
robustness, fairness and more. Thirdly, SOCRATES provides
two new algorithms, i.e., optimization-based falsification and
statistical model checking, which can be applied to verify or
falsify a variety of neural network models. More importantly,
SOCRATES is designed to be modular and extensive, i.e., it is
straightforward to support new models, properties or verifica-
tion algorithms; or integrate existing verification engines.
Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive set of 12347
verification tasks (i.e., neural network models and respective
assertions) as a part of the SOCRATES repository so that
researchers can easily evaluate and compare the effectiveness
and efficiency of different verification algorithms using a
comprehensive set of benchmarks. Using the benchmarks, we
conduct multiple experiments to evaluate the effectiveness
of the two verification algorithms developed in SOCRATES.
The experiment results show that the two new algorithms
solve more verification tasks than existing approaches and
offer complimentary verification results. We remark that
SOCRATES is open source at [20] and we are making all the
effort required to make it a platform for synergistic research
on verification of neural networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the overall design of SOCRATES. In Section III,
we present details on the model format in JSON supported
in SOCRATES. In Section IV, we present the two new algo-
rithms supported in SOCRATES and evaluate their effectiveness
against state-of-the-art approaches. In Section V, we review
related work and we conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
SOCRATES is designed for both ordinary users who require
a tool for verifying a particular neural network model as well
as researchers who are working on developing neural network
verification techniques. In the following, we first illustrate how
SOCRATES works from an ordinary user point of view and
then introduce its design from a verification researcher point
of view. Lastly, we provide an overview of functionalities
provided by SOCRATES and those by existing verification
toolkits for neural networks.
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Fig. 1. An example neuron network
A. For Ordinary Users
To use SOCRATES to verify a well-trained neural network
against a desirable property, a user must provide a JSON file
which encodes the verification task in the required format. A
verification task is composed of three main parts, i.e., a model,
a property, and a verification engine selected for solving the
verification task. The JSON format is designed to support a
variety of neural network models. The model part of a JSON
file can be generated automatically from models trained using
existing frameworks such as Tensorflow and PyTorch. The
property part of the JSON file is specified in an assertion
language designed for neural network verification, with a
formal syntax as well as supporting easy-to-use templates for
commonly verified properties. Together with the model and
the property are JSON keys for specifying the verification
engine. Note that some verification engines have configurable
parameters, which are specified as part of the JSON file as
well. The readers are referred to Section III-A and III-B for
details on the format. Once the JSON file is loaded, the user
simply waits for the verification result.
In the following, we use an example to illustrate the process.
Assume that the user has trained a network for classifying
images with 1 channel and a dimension of 28× 28 (i.e., 784
pixels in total) based on the MNIST dataset. The design of
the neural network is shown in Figure 1. It is a multilayer
perceptron with 4 layers. Beside the input layer, each of the
two hidden layers has 50 neurons, and the output layer has
10 neurons. The activation function used in two hidden layers
is the ReLU function, and the output layer uses the softmax
function to return the probability of each class according to the
input sample. The property to be verified is local robustness,
i.e., given a particular input image, with a limit on the value
of each pixel to be perturbed, all perturbed images have the
same label as the original one.
The JSON file is shown in Figure 2. At line 2, a model is
defined with the key model. The value of model is a JSON
object. At line 3, the value of the key shape is specified as an
integer tuple which represents the shape of the input sample.
For this example, the value is (1, 784) where 1 is the length
of the sample and 784 is the size of each element in the
sample. At line 4, the key bounds specifies the lower bound
and the upper bound respectively for features in valid input
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samples. In this example, the bound [(0, 1)] means each of
the features in a valid input (i.e., a feature vector) is a value
v which satisfies 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. Lines 5 to 24 then specify the
value of the key layers, i.e., an array in which each element
specifies the details of one layer. In this example, the array
contains information of the two hidden layers and the output
layer. Note that the details of the input layer are not necessary
(since they have been specified using other keys). Each array
element specifies the type of the layer, the value of the weights
matrix, the values of the bias and the activation function. These
information are defined using the keys type, weights, bias and
func respectively. We remark that the values of weights and
bias are omitted as they are rather complicated, e.g., the value
of weights for the first hidden layer is a matrix of dimension
784 × 50 written as a string with a syntax similar to the
right-hand side of Python multidimensional array initialization.
Instead of providing these values directly, the user can provide
addresses to the files (either local or online) containing their
values. Note that the key values might be correlated and thus
must be checked for well-formness, i.e., the first dimension of
the weight matrix must be equal to the number of neurons in
the previous layer; the second dimension of the weight matrix
and the size of the bias vector must be equal to the number
of neurons in the current layer.
Lines 26 to 31 then define the property to be verified.
In this example, the property is local robustness which is
specified with multiple keys. The key x0 is an input image,
i.e., a vector of size 784, or an address to an image. In this
example, assume that the input image is the one shown on
the left of Figure 3, i.e., an image from the MNIST dataset
with label 7. The key distance specifies the searching space
using one of the predefined functions in the framework. In this
example, the distance function is the infinity norm distance,
which intuitively means the maximum element-wise absolute
difference between two samples. Finally, the key eps specifies
the maximum value of the distance. We remark that in this
example, a predefined template for local robustness is used.
SOCRATES supports a general assertion language, which we
present in Section III-B.
Lines 32 to 34 then specify the verification engine that is
applied to solving the verification problem. In this example,
the user selects an optimization-based falsifier. The falsifier
automatically transforms the verification problem into an op-
timization problem, which is then solved using an optimization
algorithm (see details in Section IV-A). An image which
violates the specified property is identified in about 1 second,
which is shown on the right of Figure 3. That is, this image
has a distance from the original image not greater than the
specified bound (i.e., 0.1 in this example) and has a label
which is not 7. Note that the JSON file also contains keys (at
lines 35-37) which are for presenting the verification result,
e.g., by setting the display function and providing a resolution.
B. For Researchers on Neural Network Verification
More relevantly, SOCRATES is designed to enable synergis-
tic effort on developing state-of-the-art verification techniques
1 {
2 " model " : {
3 " shape " : " ( 1 , 7 8 4 ) " ,
4 " bounds " : " [ ( 0 , 1 ) ] " ,
5 " l a y e r s " : [
6 {
7 " t y p e " : " l i n e a r " ,
8 " w e i g h t s " : " a [784 x 50] m a t r i x " ,
9 " b i a s " : " a [ 5 0 ] v e c t o r " ,
10 " func " : "ReLU"
11 } ,
12 {
13 " t y p e " : " l i n e a r " ,
14 " w e i g h t s " : " a [50 x 50] m a t r i x " ,
15 " b i a s " : " a [ 5 0 ] v e c t o r " ,
16 " func " : "ReLU"
17 } ,
18 {
19 " t y p e " : " l i n e a r " ,
20 " w e i g h t s " : " a [50 x 10] m a t r i x " ,
21 " b i a s " : " a [ 1 0 ] v e c t o r " ,
22 " func " : " so f tmax "
23 }
24 ]
25 } ,
26 " a s s e r t " : {
27 " r o b u s t n e s s " : " l o c a l " ,
28 " x0 " : " a [ 7 8 4 ] v e c t o r " ,
29 " d i s t a n c e " : " i n f i n i t e norm " ,
30 " eps " : " 0 . 1 "
31 } ,
32 " s o l v e r " : {
33 " a l g o r i t h m " : " o p t i m i z e "
34 } ,
35 " d i s p l a y " : {
36 " r e s o l u t i o n " : " ( 2 8 , 2 8 ) "
37 }
38 }
Fig. 2. An example JSON input
Fig. 3. Example analysis results
for neural networks. It has a publisher-subscriber architecture
which facilitates developing verification techniques for differ-
ent neural network models and properties independently. It
has three main modules, i.e., the Parser and Display on the
front-end and Verifiers on the back-end. In the following, we
briefly discuss the main functionality of each component. The
technical details are discussed in the subsequent sections.
The Parser module is built upon the JSON format (as ex-
emplified in Figure 2). The parser receives a JSON file, checks
its well-formness, decodes it and publishes it internally as a
verification task. Note that each verification task is associated
with a number of parameters (such as the network model
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type, size and the assertion type), which are used to determine
whether a verification engine is applicable or not. The models
which are currently supported in SOCRATES include multilayer
perceptron (MLP), convolutional networks (CNN), residual
networks (ResNet), and recurrent networks (RNN). To support
new models, the developers are required to extend the JSON
format (by introducing new values for certain existing keys or
introducing new keys) and extend the parser accordingly to
generate the verification task, which is relatively easy.
The Verifiers module consists of a set of verification engines
which could be developed independently from each other.
Each verification engine could be either general or specific
(i.e., dedicated to certain models or certain properties, such
as many existing verification engines [14], [15]). For instance,
SOCRATES supports two general verification engines which
applies to all neural network models which are currently
supported in SOCRATES. The first one is an optimization-based
falsification engine, which transforms the verification task into
the problem of finding a counterexample through optimization.
The second one is a statistical model checking [21] engine
which can be used to verify that the assertion holds with cer-
tain level of statistical confidence. As the verification engines
are independent, extending SOCRATES with a new verification
algorithm is straightforward.
The Display module is used to present the verification
results in a user-friendly way to the user. A verification engine
typically generates three kinds of results, i.e., the property is
verified, no counterexample is identified (e.g., which timeout
occurs) or a counterexample is identified. Depending on the
application domain and the property, the counterexample could
be an image, a text, a feature vector or a set of them (for
instance, if the property to be verified is individual fairness,
two contrasting feature vectors form a counterexample). The
display module receives the result from the verification engines
and displays them accordingly. Note that some additional keys
are defined in the JSON format so that the user can specify
the display options.
C. Functionalities
SOCRATES is designed to be a unified platform supporting
a variety of neural network models, properties and verification
algorithms. In the following, we compare SOCRATES with
existing state-of-the-art approaches in terms of functionalities.
There are recently a booming number verification engines for
neural networks and thus it is hard to keep up with all of
them. Our search of state-of-the-art tools are based on research
papers recently published at top-tier conferences and it is
possible that we might miss some of them. Furthermore, not all
tools reported in the publications are available for evaluation
(or reliable enough to be evaluated independently). The follow-
ing are the tools that we gather and compare: Reluplex [10],
Neurify [12], DeepZ [14], DeepPoly [15], RefineZono [22],
RefinePoly [23], ADF [9], and C&W [8]. Note that the last
two are technically not verification engines but rather testing
engines. They are included as representatives of their kind
to provide additional benchmark on the state-of-the-art for
Fig. 4. The architecture of SOCRATES
falsification. Their results however should be taken with a
grain of salt as they are designed for completely different
purpose. To find out the functionalities of each tool, we check
the papers which reported the tool and experiment the tool
to find out whether new capabilities have been introduced
recently. For each tool, we identify the kind of neural network
models and the kind of properties that are supported.
The comparison is summarized in Table I, where N means
partial support (i.e., only works with small networks and may
not be scallable to bigger ones). In terms of models supported
by the tools, it can be observed that SOCRATES is the only
tool which supports all types of neural networks. For Reluplex,
experiments on verifying small multilayer perceptron networks
have been reported. For Neurify, besides multilayer percep-
tron, it also supports convolutional networks. The next four
tools, i.e., DeepZ, DeepPoly, RefineZono and RefinePoly, have
the same capability, i.e., they support multilayer perceptron,
convolutional, and residual networks. For ADF, the reported
experiments only deal with small multilayer perceptron net-
works. All of the adversarial sample generation tools that
C&W represents focus on the image recognition problem, and
thus do not support recurrent networks.
The properties that each tool can handle are shown in
the last column in Table I. We again observe that only
SOCRATES supports all types of properties. Most of the other
tools support the local robustness property. Reluplex report-
edly supports verification of the global robustness property for
small networks. Other tools except ADF do not support global
robustness. Most of the tools can support reachability prop-
erties expressed using linear (in)equalities, execpt ADF and
C&W. Besides ADF which supports falsification of fairness
properties (through a combination of clustering and searching),
fairness properties are only supported by SOCRATES.
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Tools Types of networks Types of propertiesMLP CNN ResNet RNN Local robust. Global robust. Lin. (in)equal. Fairness
SOCRATES F F F F F F F F
Reluplex N © © © F N F ©
Neurify F F © © F © F ©
DeepZ F F F © F © F ©
DeepPoly F F F © F © F ©
RefineZono F F F © F © F ©
RefinePoly F F F © F © F ©
ADF* N © © © F F © F
C&W* F F F © F © © ©
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SUPPORTED NETWORKS AND PROPERTIES. F: FULL SUPPORT, N: PARTIAL SUPPORT,©: NO SUPPORT
D. Implementation
SOCRATES is open source at [20], including all the source
code as well as a set of 12347 verification tasks. SOCRATES is
implemented using Python 3 with a total of 2400 lines of code.
Multiple public Python libraries are used in the implementa-
tion, including json and ast for parsing the JSON input file,
numpy and autograd.numpy for mathematical computation,
matplotlib for displaying imagery results, and sicpy for solving
the optimization problem. By default, the local optimization
function (instead of the global one) in scipy is applied,
although this can be easily configured.
SOCRATES is designed with the extensiblity in mind. The
types of network models supported by SOCRATES can be eas-
ily extended by introducing new types of layers and activation
functions. Currently, each type of layer is implemented as an
independent class. In each class, the most important function is
apply, which compute the output vector from the input vector.
To extend the capability of SOCRATES with new type of layer,
a new class can simply added into the library. Similarly, all
the supported activation functions are kept inside an utility
class. The new functions can be easily added at any time. The
new types of layers and activation functions may need new
parameters, which should not be the problem because users
can always define the new keys for the JSON input file and
update the JSON parser to represent the necessary parameters.
In SOCRATES, the property can be a first-order logic for-
mula composed from a set of predefined functions or a map
contains syntactic sugar definition (see Section III-B for more
details). SOCRATES has a parser (independent from the above
JSON parser) implemented with ANTLR to parse general first-
order logic formula in form of string, then returns an AST to
represent the formula. The expressiveness of the formula can
be extended by adding new predefined functions and update
the parser. Otherwise, users can define new syntactic sugar
keys to model new properties.
Finally, similar to the layers, each verification engine in
SOCRATES is an independent class. So the new engines can
be easily added as the new classes in SOCRATES. The most
important function in these classes is solve, which receives a
model and a property, then applies a specific algorithm of the
engine. Each engine can be designed to solve general problem
with property in form of first-order logic formula or just its
own specific problem defined with its own set of syntactic
sugar keys. Moreover, each engine may have its own meta
parameters which use to configure its algorithm. As explained
previously, these parameters are easily defined using new keys
and then can be provided in JSON input file.
III. THE JSON INPUTS
Existing efforts on neural network verification techniques
have results in multiple impressive tools, such as Deep-
Poly [15] and Reluplex [10]. These tools, however, have their
own input format. For instance, Reluplex only supports mul-
tilayer perceptron networks and requires a text file containing
the number of layers, the number of neurons in each layer, the
normalization information, as well as weights and bias values
of each layer in the network. DeepPoly, on the other hand,
supports different types of networks and thus it requires the
type of each layer before the values of the layer’s parameters
(e.g., weights and bias). Moreover, because DeepPoly focuses
on local robustness, it allows users to define the distance value
between samples explicitly, whereas Reluplex does not have
this feature. As a result, it is hard to compare the performance
of different tools or to combine techniques developed by
different research groups. Furthermore, existing toolkits are
often developed for specific properties. For instance, DeepPoly
is designed for verifying local robustness; Reluplex focuses
on reachability properties; and ADF focuses on falsifying
a particular notion of fairness only. A close investigation
however shows that an algorithm developed in one tool (e.g.,
the one developed in ADF) could be potentially extended to
verify other properties (e.g., local or global robustness). Thus,
we develop a JSON format which supports a variety of neural
network models and an assertion language which allows user
to specify a range of properties.
A. Specifying Models
The JSON file is composed a sequence of keys which
specifies the details of the network model and the property.
The keys used to define the model are shown in Table II. At
the top-level, a model is specified using the key model. The
value of model is then defined as a JSON object using a triple
consisting of keys shape, bounds, and layers. The key shape is
used to define the shape of the input sample, which is a tuple
containing multiple integer values. The first value represents
the length of the sample. Note that the first value is always
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Key Definition
model The details of the network model
shape The shape of input sample
bounds The bounds of input sample
layers The details of model layers
type The type of a layer
weights The weights matrix of a layer
bias The bias vector of a layer
func The activation function of a layer
filters The filters matrix of a conv. layer
padding The padding value of a conv. layer
stride The stride value of a conv. layer
h0 The h0 vector of a recurrent layer
c0 The c0 vector of a recurrent layer
path The path to the pre-trained model
TABLE II
THE KEYS USED TO DEFINE THE NETWORK MODEL
1 for non-recurrent neuron networks and is n with n ≥ 1 for
recurrent neural networks. The remaining numbers represent
the shape for each element in the sample. For instance, the
tuple (5, 80) means that the input sample is a sequence with
length 5 and each element in the sequence is a vector with
size 80.
The key bounds is used to define the bounds of values for
valid input samples. Its value is a string representing an array
containing tuples. Suppose the number of features in the input
sample is n and the number of tuples in the bounds array is m,
we require that (n mod m) = 0. With the above condition,
the i-th element in the bounds array is used to constraint the
values of input features from index i∗nm to index
(i+1)∗n
m −
1. Each element in the array then is a tuple containing two
numbers ai and bi such that ai ≤ bi. The first number ai is
the lower bound and the second number bi is the upper bound
of the corresponding input features.
The key layers specifies details of the network layer-by-
layer. Its value is an array. Each element in the array is a
JSON object which represents a layer in the network with a
specific type. According to each type, a layer may contain
multiple keys to specify parameters of the layer. In general,
each layer can be considered as a function, which produces
an output from an input. The original sample of the network
is the input of the first layer, the output of layer n is the
input of layer n + 1, and the output of the last layer is the
output of the whole network. Table III summarizes the types
of layers that are currently supported in SOCRATES as well as
their definitions and parameters.
Each type is associated with a list of parameter values which
are specified with one or more predefined keys. For instance,
keys weights, bias, and func are used to define the weights
matrix, the bias vector, and the activation function respectively
as shown in Figure 2. Depending on the type of the layer, keys
such as filters, stride, padding, h0 and c0 are used to define the
values of filters matrix, stride value, padding value, h0 vector
and c0 vector respectively. In case the layer has more than one
parameters of the same type, indexes are used to distinguish
them. For instance, the two filters matrices in a ResNet2l layer
can be defined with two keys filters1 and filters2.
For the key func, the value must be one of those predefined
function names. SOCRATES supports a range of functions
which are commonly applied in defining neuron networks.
Each function may require additional parameters, which could
be specified with additional keys. The details of functions
supported in SOCRATES are shown in Table IV.
We acknowledge that, for ordinary users, it may be cumber-
some to define (or generate using a program) JSON files in
the above format. One remedy is to support automatically
translating of models trained using popular frameworks such
as Tensorflow or PyTorch. That is, a user simply provides a
path to a PyTorch pre-trained model file as the value for the
key path. SOCRATES then loads the model automatically.
B. Assertion Language
For traditional software programs, many assertion languages
have been developed, ranging from simple state-based asser-
tions, logic such as Hoare logic [24], temporal logic [25] and
separation logic [26], to formal specification languages such
as the Z language [27] and CSP [28]. Existing verification
engines however specify neural network properties in an ad
hoc way. Neural networks, as a new programming paradigm,
have been applied in a variety of applications. In other words,
different neural networks are expected to satisfy different
specifications. It is thus important that we have a language
for specifying desirable properties of neural networks.
Designing an assertion language is highly non-trivial. We
must answer questions such as what is considered a behavior
of a neural network and what correctness specification we
typically associate with the behaviors. As of now, we take
a black-box view of neural networks, i.e., the behavior of a
neural network is defined by its input/output relationship. In
other words, from a correctness point of view, a neural network
can be viewed as a function M such that, given an input
feature vector x, M(x) is the output vector. It is based on this
view that we design our assertion language. We remark that
with the development of more complicated neural networks,
we might have to reason about internal states of neural network
models, in which case our assertion language must be refined
accordingly.
Formally, a property in SOCRATES is in the general form of
∀x¯. ψpre ⇒ ψpost where ψpre is a precondition constraining
input samples and ψpost is a postcondition constraining the
output and label. Both ψpre and ψpost are specified using
a fragment of first-order logic with built-in functions. The
syntax is shown in Figure 5, which is designed to balance
expressive and efficiency in terms of verification. For instance,
all free variables in the assertion are universally quantified.
Furthermore, each variable x is assumed to be an input of
the network, i.e., a feature vector of the specified dimension.
Each clause may be a conjunction or disjunction of primitive
propositions. Each proposition is an (in)equality, in which each
side is a nested application of predefined functions.
Note that there are restrictions such as no existential quan-
tifiers, which limit the expressiveness of the language but
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Type Definition Parameters
Linear A fully-connected layer 1 weights matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 optional activation function
MaxPool1d A 1-dimensional max pooling layer 1 stride value, 1 padding value
MaxPool2d A 2-dimensional max pooling layer 1 stride value, 1 padding value
MaxPool3d A 3-dimensional max pooling layer 1 stride value, 1 padding value
Conv1d A 1-dimensional convolutional layer 1 filters matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 stride value, 1 padding value
Conv2d A 2-dimensional convolutional layer 1 filters matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 stride value, 1 padding value
Conv3d A 3-dimensional convolutional layer 1 filters matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 stride value, 1 padding value
ResNet2l A 2-layers residual block 2(+1) filters matrices, 2(+1) bias vectors, 2(+1) stride values, 2(+1) padding values
ResNet3l A 3-layers residual block 3(+1) filters matrices, 3(+1) bias vectors, 3(+1) stride values, 3(+1) padding values
RNN A basic RNN layer 1 weights matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 h0 vector, 1 optional activation function
LSTM A LSTM layer 1 weights matrix, 1 bias vector, 1 h0 vector, 1 c0 vector
GRU A GRU layer 2 weights matrices, 2 bias vectors, 1 h0 vector, 1 c0 vector
Function A standalone function layer 1 function name, other optional parameters for the function
TABLE III
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF LAYERS SUPPORTED BY SOCRATES
Function Parameters Keys Values
ReLU None None None
Sigmoid None None None
Tanh None None None
Softmax None None None
Reshape A new shape for the input newshape A tuple
Transpose A new axes to be permuted axes A tuple
TABLE IV
FUNCTIONS SUPPORTED BY SOCRATES
also the complexity of the verification problem. For instance,
supporting nested quantifiers would complicate the verification
algorithm significantly. Yet these restrictions do not prevent
interesting properties from being specified. In the following,
we show how to specify a range of properties which are often
relevant to neural network applications. Note that a constant
can be represented by the built-in id function.
• A reachability property specifies that if an input satisfies
certain constraint (e.g., in certain range), the neural net-
work output must satisfy certain constraint (e.g., in certain
range). Such constraints have been supported in existing
tools such as Reluplex [10]. Specifying such constraint
in our language is straightforward. For instance, the
following is property 2 from [10] written in our language.
ψpre : x[0] ≥ 55947.691 ∧ x[3] ≥ 1145 ∧ x[4] ≤ 60,
ψpost : L(x) 6= 0
where x is a free variable; [i] is the indexed access
function (i.e., x[3] is the 4th element in the feature
vector); and L is the labeling function (i.e., it returns
the index of the maximum value1 in the output vector
according to x). Intuitively, the property states that if the
input satisfies the precondition, the label must not be 0.
• Robustness is a desirable property for many neural net-
works. Robustness can be further distinguished into local
robustness or global robustness. The former has been the
subject of neural network verification and testing in many
works [10], [14], [15]. It states that any sample x′ which
is similar to a particular existing sample x must have the
1SOCRATES also supports another labelling function which returns the index
of the minimum value.
same label of x. It is specified in our language as follows.
ψpre : di(x, x0) ≤ c,
ψpost : L(x) = L(x0)
where x0 is a constant representing an existing sample;
c is a constant; di is a predefined function which returns
the infinity norm distance between two feature vectors.
As shown in Figure 5, users may choose to use d0 or
d2 to specify the 0-norm distance or 2-norm distance
alternatively. Global robustness states that similar samples
should have the same label. Note that local robustness
is defined based on a particular sample whereas global
robustness refers to all samples (including those not in
the training set). It can be specified as follows.
ψpre : di(x, y) ≤ c,
ψpost : L(x) = L(y)
where both x and y are universally quantified variables.
• Fairness is a desirable property for neural network mod-
els which may have societal impact. While there are
many definitions for fairness [29], one is called individual
discrimination, which can be specified as follows. For
simplicity, assume that the first feature of the inputs is
the only sensitive feature (such as gender or race).
ψpre : x[0] 6= y[0] ∧ x[1] = y[1] ∧ · · · ∧ x[n] = y[n],
ψpost : L(x) = L(y)
Intuitively, the above states that for all pair of samples, if
the two samples differ only by the sensitive feature, their
labels must be the same.
• Miscellaneous properties other than those defined above
can be defined in our language as well. For instance,
the following specifies a property which is related to
the interpretability of the model. Let p(x) and q(x) be
two propositions defined based on a sample that are
expressible in our assertion language.
ψpre : p(x) = p(y) ∧ q(x) = q(y),
ψpost : L(x) = L(y)
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φ := ∀x¯. ψpre ⇒ ψpost
ψ := ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | ϕ
ϕ := f¯1(x¯1, c¯1) ./ f¯2(x¯2, c¯2)
./ := > | ≥ | < | ≤ | = | 6=
f := id i.e., the identify function
| M i.e., the network model application
| L i.e., the labeling function
| N i.e., a linear function
| [i] i.e., the indexed access function
| d0 i.e., 0-norm distance function
| d2 i.e., 2-norm distance function
| di i.e., infinity norm distance function
Fig. 5. Syntax for assertion language where ψpre is a precondition; ψpost
is a postcondition; ϕ is a primitive proposition; x¯ is a set of input variables;
c¯ is a set of constants; f¯ is a nested application of built-in functions.
Intuitively, the above assertion specifies that if two ar-
bitrary samples are indistinguishable by proposition p
and q, their labels must be the same. In other words,
if the property is verified, we successfully show that this
neural network model could be interpreted using a simple
model, for instance, in form of a decision tree with the
proposition p and q.
Syntactic Sugars We acknowledge that it may be diffi-
cult for ordinary users to write properties formally. Thus,
SOCRATES provides another way to define commonly verified
properties via predefined templates. In the following, we
briefly discuss one example template. That is, a robustness
property can be defined using the following keys.
1 {
2 "robustness": "local" | "global",
3 "x0": "a floating-point vector",
4 "distance": "d0" | "d2" | "di",
5 "eps": "a floating-point number"
6 "fairness": "an integer vector"
7 }
With the above keys, users can choose to check either local
or global robustness. In case of local robustness, users can
specify the value of the original sample x0. Users can also
choose different distance functions and define the maximum
value for the distance. One example of applying the template
has been presented in Section II-A.
C. A Benchmark Repository
To demonstrate that our JSON format is expressive enough
to capture real-world verification tasks, we build a repository
of neural network verification tasks based on the above-
described JSON format. Verification tasks (i.e., a neural net-
work model together with a property to be verified) which have
been reported in various publications have been systematically
collected and transformed into the JSON format. Furthermore,
due to lack of certain types of models, we additionally train
multiple models, which are added into the repository as well.
Each task is labeled with the expected verification result. So
far we have not encountered any verification task which cannot
be transformed. The goal is to build a large repository of
verification tasks which can serve as a standard comprehensive
benchmark for neural network verification research. As of now,
the repository contains a set of 12347 verification tasks, all of
which can be downloaded at [30]. In a nutshell, the repository
contains the following network models.
• 45 multilayer perceptron networks and 10 properties used
in the experiments of Reluplex [10].
• 21 multilayer perceptron and convolutional networks
and local robustness property with 100 samples from 2
datasets used in the experiments of DeepZ [14], Deep-
Poly [15], RefineZono [22], and RefinePoly [23].
• 3 multilayer perceptron networks and fairness property
with 100 samples from 3 datasets used in the experiments
of ADF [9].
• 4 recurrent networks and local robustness property with
100 samples from 2 datasets, trained by us.
• 1 convolutional network and local robustness property
with 10000 samples in MNIST challenge [31].
IV. VERIFICATION ENGINES
With the JSON format and the assertion language, a variety
of neural network verification problems can be expressed in
SOCRATES. Solving them is however the real problem. While
we do not claim that SOCRATES is or will be able to solve
all of them, we do hope that it provides a platform for re-
searchers to jointly experiment and develop ever-more capable
verification algorithms. As of now, SOCRATES has integrated
multiple existing verification engines. Furthermore, observing
that existing approaches are limited to restrictive classes of
neural networks, we develop two verification engines which
are applicable to all neural network models and properties
that are currently supported in SOCRATES. In the following,
we describe the details of these two verification engines.
A. Optimization-based Falsification
The first engine is an optimization-based falsification algo-
rithm which is inspired by existing methods on adversarial
perturbation [8] and fairness testing [9].
Given a model M and an arbitrary property φ in our asser-
tion language, we compile the network model into a function
representation internally. The function takes samples as inputs,
and produces the output vectors. The definition of the function
is built according to the defined layers, layer-by-layer, based
on the type of the layer and the provided parameters. For
instance, with a linear layer, we have y = f(w ∗x+ b) where
x is the output of the previous layer; w is the weights matrix;
b is the bias vector; f is the activation function; and y is the
output of the layer. The result is a function for which, given
some particular input, we can easily observe its output as well
as the internal computation details, i.e., inputs and outputs of
each layer.
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To falsify the property φ which is in the form of ∀x¯. ψpre ⇒
ψpost, we aim to identify input samples such that ψpre is
satisfied and ψpost is not, i.e., we find an input sample that
satisfies ψpre ∧ ¬ψpost. Our idea is to turn this falsification
problem into an optimization problem, i.e., we define a loss
function based on the formula ψpre∧¬ψpost and apply guided-
search to identify an input sample which satisfies the formula
gradually. Intuitively, the loss function is defined to measure
how close an input sample is to violate the property and once
it is minimized to 0, we successfully falsify the property.
Formally, the loss function is defined systematically according
to the syntax of the assertion. That is, given any formula ψ,
loss(ψ) =

loss(ψ1) + loss(ψ2) if ψ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2
loss(ψ1) ∗ loss(ψ2) if ψ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2
loss(ϕ) otherwise
where ϕ is f¯1(x¯1, c¯1) ./ f¯2(x¯2, c¯2) and loss(ϕ) is defined as
follows.
loss(ϕ) =

max(0, v2 − v1 + k) if ./ is >
max(0, v2 − v1) if ./ is ≥
max(0, v1 − v2 + k) if ./ is <
max(0, v1 − v2) if ./ is ≤
max(0, |v1 − v2|) if ./ is =
nid(v1, v2, k) if ./ is 6=
where v1 and v2 are values of f¯1(x¯1, c¯1) and f¯2(x¯2, c¯2)
according to the current value of x¯, k is a small positive
number (i.e., 10−9) and nid(a, b, k) is 0 if a 6= b; otherwise it
is k. The general idea is the loss function for ϕ should be 0 if
the clause is satisfied and be positive otherwise. The number
k guarantees that the value of loss(ϕ) only reaches 0 when
ϕ is satisfied. Moreover, the positive value should show how
close the input samples are to satisfy the clause.
The falsification problem thus becomes the following opti-
mization problem.
arg min
x¯
loss(ψpre ∧ ¬ψpost)
There are many techniques which can be applied to solve this
optimization problems. In SOCRATES, by default we solve the
above constraint optimization problem using the L-BFGS-B
algorithm (as there is a mature implementation available in the
scipy library). The algorithm uses the gradient and the estimate
of the inverse Hessian matrix of the objective function to
guide the search for the minimum value, while maintaining the
simple range constraints for variables. The readers are referred
to [32] and [33] for details of the L-BFGS-B algorithm.
Note that the algorithm terminates when the projected
gradient or the change in the value of the objective function
is less than a predefined threshold. Because of that reason,
this falsification engine produces three kinds of results, i.e.,
successful falsification with a counterexample, successful ter-
mination without a counterexample, and timeout. Note that
there is a subtle difference between the latter two results.
While there is no guarantee that there is no counterexample
(i.e., the property is verified) when the algorithm terminates
without a counterexample, it arguably provides slightly more
‘evidence’ that the property may be true, compared to the case
of a timeout (where optimization is still on-going and thus may
find a counterexample if more time is given).
Example 1. In the following, we show how the above-
described approach works through verifying a fairness prop-
erty. The model is a six-layer MLP and is used to predict
the income of an adult. The model is trained with the Cen-
sus Income dataset [34]. In the dataset, the input has 13
features, which represent personal information of an adult.
Among them, 3 features at index 0, 7, and 8 are sensitive
features, which represent age, race, and gender respectively.
The output is one of the 2 labels, which represents whether
the income of an adult is above $50000. The model can
be easily represented in our JSON format. For simplicity,
assume that the property to verify is a local fairness property,
i.e., all samples which are different from the given sample
x0 = [4, 0, 7, 0, 0, 4, 2, 0, 1, 5, 0, 40, 0] by only the sensitive
features have the same label.
Other than the range constraints for valid inputs (which is
defined in the model), the precondition ψpre is x[1] = 0 ∧
x[2] = 7∧· · ·∧x[6] = 2∧x[9] = 5∧· · ·∧x[12] = 0∧ (x[0] 6=
4∨x[7] 6= 0∨x[8] 6= 1). The label of the given input is 1 and
thus the postcondition is ψpost : L(x) = 1. The optimization
engine then tries to generate a sample x which satisfies ψpre
but violates ψpost. After less than 1 second, a sample x is
found with value x = [2.8769, 0, 7, 0, 0, 4, 2, 0, 1, 5, 0, 40, 0]
and output vector for x is [0.5486, 0.4418], which results a
label of 0. With this result, we can conclude that the model is
not locally fair around the given sample.
B. Experiment results
In the following, we systematically evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of this falsification engine using benchmark
verification tasks in our repository presented in Section III-C,
and compare its performance against a number of state-of-
the-art tools. All the experiments are performed by a machine
with 3.1Ghz 8-core CPU and 64GB RAM. The results are
summarized in Table V.
In the table, the first 2 columns show the properties and the
networks under verify respectively. For the local robustness
property, we use infinity norm distance with the maximum
value is 0.1. Note that the model name is coded with informa-
tion such as the type of network, the activation function and
additional parameters. Given a model and a property, there
may be many verification tasks (i.e., different local robustness
property for different input samples). The third column shows
the number of verification tasks in each setting. Note that for
local robustness and fairness properties, we randomly choose
100 samples from the datasets and for each network only the
samples which are classified correctly (by comparing with the
provided ground truth) are used in the verification tasks.
The next 4 columns show the results of Reluplex (commit
ID: e2e48b2 on 10 Oct 2018), RefineZono and RefinePoly
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Prop. Networks #Tasks Reluplex RefineZono RefinePoly SOCRATESV F Time V F∗ Time V F∗ Time V∗ F Time
P1 [10] ACASXU_*_* (all networks) 45 0 0 45m × × × × × × 45 0 32s
P2 [10] ACASXU_x_* (x ≥ 2) 36 0 8 32m × × × × × × 8 28 23s
P3 [10] ACASXU_*_* 6= (1_{7, 8, 9}) 42 8 0 38m39s × × × × × × 42 0 29s
P4 [10] ACASXU_*_* 6= (1_{7, 8, 9}) 42 5 0 40m7s × × × × × × 42 0 29s
P5 [10] ACASXU_1_1 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
P6 [10] ACASXU_1_1 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
P7 [10] ACASXU_1_9 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
P8 [10] ACASXU_2_9 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
P9 [10] ACASXU_3_3 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
P10 [10] ACASXU_4_5 1 0 0 1m × × × × × × 1 0 1s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_4_1024 98 × × × 0 79 1h 0 65 1h 23 75 33s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_6_100 99 × × × 0 99 9m14s 0 99 4m32s 10 89 17s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_9_200 97 × × × 0 97 41m20s 0 97 28m4s 10 87 15s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500 95 × × × 0 95 42m45s × × × 4 91 13s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500_PGD_0.1 100 × × × 0 100 44m56s × × × 90 10 3m47s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500_PGD_0.3 97 × × × 0 97 43m53s × × × 84 13 2m37s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500 99 × × × 0 99 45m44s × × × 17 82 1m4s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500_PGD_0.1 100 × × × 0 100 45m57s × × × 97 3 3m8s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500_PGD_0.3 100 × × × 0 100 46m29s × × × 97 3 3m5s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU 100 × × × 35 65 3m35s 48 52 10m16s 89 1 49s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU_DAI 99 × × × 94 5 3m 95 4 2m44s 96 3 1m17s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU_PGD 100 × × × 76 24 4m2s 88 12 8m28s 98 2 55s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Big_ReLU_DAI 95 × × × 92 3 17m11s 65 1 1h 94 1 6m35s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Super_ReLU_DAI 99 × × × 15 0 1h 9 0 1h 97 2 20m24s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_6_100 16 × × × 0 16 2m33s 0 16 1m43s 0 16 6s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_7_1024 16 × × × 0 8 1h 0 8 1h 0 16 34s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_9_200 9 × × × 0 9 4m34s 0 9 4m 0 9 8s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU 59 × × × 0 59 6m58s 0 59 18m13s 0 59 8s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU_DAI 53 × × × 0 53 3m50s 0 53 14m1s 2 51 12s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU_PGD 70 × × × 0 70 8m23s 0 70 21m23s 0 70 9s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Big_ReLU_DAI 60 × × × 0 3 1h 0 11 1h 0 60 25s
Robust. Jigsaw_GRU 94 × × × × × × × × × 65 29 7m1s
Robust. Jigsaw_LSTM 93 × × × × × × × × × 69 24 12m38s
Robust. Wiki_GRU 96 × × × × × × × × × 55 41 11m22s
Robust. Wiki_LSTM 94 × × × × × × × × × 44 50 29m42s
Fairness Bank_MLP_6_Layers 99 × × × × × × × × × 90 9 4s
Fairness Census_MLP_6_Layers 86 × × × × × × × × × 62 24 4s
Fairness Credit_MLP_6_Layers 100 × × × × × × × × × 56 44 3s
Total 73 networks 2494 13 8 2h41m 312 1181 10h14m 305 556 6h53 1492 992 1h49m
TABLE V
EXPERIMENT WITH REACHABILITY, LOCAL ROBUSTNESS AND FAIRNESS PROPERTY. SOCRATES ENGINE: OPTIMIZATION.
(commit ID: e2ff1fd on 7 Jul 2020), and SOCRATES respec-
tively. The sub-column V shows the number of verified tasks,
and the sub-column F shows the number of falsified tasks with
counterexamples. Note that when SOCRATES may successfully
terminate without a counterexample, it does not guarantee that
the task is verified and we indicate such results using a sub-
column titled V∗. RefineZono and RefinePoly do not return
counterexamples, instead they report "Failed" for tasks that
they fail to verify, which we indicate in the sub-columns F∗.
We use the symbol × to indicate that the verification task is
not supported by the tool or an exception is thrown during
the execution. For instance, most of the results from Reluplex
are × other that those on the ACASXU models because of
2 reasons. First, Reluplex does not support convolutional or
recurrent networks or fairness properties. Secondly, Reluplex
can only handle inputs with a small number of features,
whereas most of the verification tasks require input samples
with several hundreds to several thousands of features. The
time each tool spends on the verification tasks are shown in
the sub-columns Time. In the experiment, we set the timeout
as 1 minute for each task from property P1 to P10 (which is
sufficient as these models are very small), and 1 hour for each
set of remaining tasks according to each network.
Note that due to the space limit, we are unable to report
the results of all 12347 verification tasks. Rather, a set of
2494 verification tasks are selected to cover different networks
and properties. From the table, we see that SOCRATES is the
only tool which can handle all the 2494 verification tasks.
Moreover, SOCRATES can finish 100% of the tasks in time
while other tools have many timeout results. In particular,
Reluplex, RefineZono, and RefinePoly can only finish 12%,
90%, and 80% of the tasks assigned to them respectively.
We remark that SOCRATES is sound when it reports that
the properties is falsified. That is, 992 tasks are successfully
falsified, with a counterexample. For the remaining tasks,
the model is more likely to satisfy the property. A practical
guideline is thus to always apply the falsification engine in
SOCRATES and apply existing verification engines only if
SOCRATES fails to falsify the property. This is particularly so
given the efficiency of the falsification engine in SOCRATES.
10
That is, although SOCRATES attempts more tasks than the
other tools, it spends much less time.
Finally, we apply the falsification engine in SOCRATES to
generate counterexample for 10000 samples in MNIST chal-
lenge, in which 9853 samples are classified correctly. The re-
sults show that SOCRATES can generate 473 counterexamples
satisfy the requirement of the challenge (i.e., the maximum
infinity-norm distance to the original sample is 0.3) after
running 15h4m.
C. Statistical Model Checking
The second verification engine we develop in SOCRATES is
based on statistical model checking (SMC [35]). Note that
SMC is chosen as it can be applied to all models and
properties. Furthermore, it is a formal verification technique
that is proven to be effective in combating the complexity of
real-world systems, such as cyber-physical systems [21].
Given a property φ in the form of ∀x¯. ψpre ⇒ ψpost, SMC
systematically evaluates the probability of those input samples
that satisfy ψpre and violate ψpost, through a form of hypoth-
esis testing. To apply SMC, the users are required to provide
4 parameters, which include the expected confidence that the
network satisfies the desired properties with probability θ, the
bound of indifferent region δ, the values of type I error α
and type II error β. With these parameters, hypothesis testing
based on the SPRT algorithm (i.e., sequential probability ratio
test [36]) is applied. The SPRT algorithm works by generating
independent and identically distributed (IID) random samples
to test the following 2 hypotheses.
• H0: The network satisfies φ with probability p ≥ p0 and
p0 = θ + δ.
• H1: The network satisfies φ with probability p ≤ p1 and
p1 = θ − δ.
The details of the SPRT algorithm are shown in Algorithm 1.
Initially, the ratio pr is set to 1. With the desired property φ, we
keep generating IID random samples. If a sample x¯ does not
satisfy the precondition ψpre, it is discarded and a new sample
is generated. In case the sample satisfies the precondition, it is
checked against the postcondition ψpost. Based on the result,
the value of pr is updated. Whenever the ratio value reaches
the threshold β/(1−α), H0 is accepted, which means that the
probability of the property being satisfied is at least θ (with a
statistical confidence defined by the parameters). Similarly, H1
is accepted whenever the ratio reaches the threshold (1−β)/α.
The above algorithm has one issue. That is, when ψpre
is complicated, it may generate many samples which do not
satisfy ψpre, and as a result, take a lot of time. This issue
can be partially solved by adopting sampling techniques such
as hit-and-run [37] or QuickSampler [38]. The basic idea of
these techniques is to apply methods like constraint solving
to generate multiple seeds and apply mutation to generate
samples based on the seeds. We omit the details as sampling
techniques are beyond the content of this paper.
Example 2. In the following, we present how we apply the
above-described SMC to check property 2 with the network
Algorithm 1: SPRT algorithm
Input: φ = ∀x¯ · ψpre =⇒ ψpost
pr = 1;
while True do
Generate an IID random sample x¯;
if x¯ does not satisfy ψpre then
continue;
if x¯ satisfies ψpost then
pr = pr ∗ p1/p0;
else
pr = pr ∗ (1− p1)/(1− p0);
if pr ≤ β/(1− α) then
Accept H0;
else if pr ≥ (1− β)/α then
Accept H1;
ACASXU_2_1 reported in [10]. The network is an MLP
with 7 layers. The input has 5 features and the output has
5 labels. In this example, we assume that the values of the
SMC parameters are set as follows: θ = 0.95, α = 0.05,
β = 0.05, δ = 0.005. As shown in Section III-B, the property
is specified as follows.
ψpre : x[0] ≥ 55947.691 ∧ x[3] ≥ 1145 ∧ x[4] ≤ 60,
ψpost : L(x) 6= 0
Note that in addition to ψpre shown above, all the input
features are associated with a range constraint which are
omitted for simplicity. Generating IID samples randomly to
satisfy ψpre is straightforward in this example as we simply
generate a random value with its range. Applying the SPRT
algorithm shown in Algorithm 1, in less than 1 second, the
value of pr reaches β/(1 − α) after 300 samples. As a
result, the hypothesis H0 (i.e., the network satisfies φ with
probability p ≥ 0.955) is accepted. We remark that accepting
H0 does not mean that the property is verified. In fact, using
the falsification engine introduced in Section IV-A, we find
an adversarial sample x = [0.6, 0, 0, 0.45, 0.45] with output
vector [0.0343,−0.0230, 0.0210,−0.0179, 0.0223] which is
labeled 0 after less than 1 second. Note that to have better
confidence on the correctness of the property, a θ value
arbitrarily closer to 1 can be adopted.
D. Experiment Results
In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency
of this verification engine. Note that this verification engine is
designed for probabilistic verification rather than falsification.
Again, we apply the engine to all the verification tasks
discussed in Section III-C. To the best of our knowledge,
SOCRATES is the only statistical model checker for neuron
networks and thus we have no baseline to compare with.
As the SPRT algorithm is parameterized with the probability
θ, we apply it to all the verification tasks with 3 different
values of θ (i.e., 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99) so that we can observe
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the effort required to reach different level of probalistic confi-
dence. The same ‘default’ values are adopted for the remaining
3 parameters, i.e., α = 0.05, β = 0.05, and δ = 0.005. The
results are shown in Tables VI.
The first column of Table VI shows the property, the second
column shows the networks are checked with the according
property, and the third column show the number of tasks.
The last 3 columns show the verification statistics with 3
different values of θ. For each value of θ, the sub-columns
H0 and H1 show the number of verification tasks in which
the hypothesis H0 and H1 are accepted respectively. As we
can see, when the value of θ increases, the number of tasks
in which H0 is accepted decreases while the number of tasks
in which H1 is accepted increases. This is an expected result
considering that θ increases means the users want to be more
confident about the verified properties. We also notice that the
numbers of generated samples for θ = 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 are
709874, 719668, and 695373 respectively. We see that there
is a reluctant between these numbers. The result is reasonable
considering that when θ increases, we need more samples to
accept H0 but less samples to accept H1. Moreover, some
specific tasks may make the value of pr go back and forth
(i.e., need more samples) before reaching the threshold. The
result helps to confirm that the number of generated samples
depends on the specific task rather than the value of θ alone.
For the time needed to run the experiment, we do not see any
significant difference between 3 settings. All of them can finish
testing 2494 tasks in less than 1 hour. However, we notice
that the running time of testing engine in this experiment is
less than half of the time needed by the falsification engine
presented in Section IV-A.
For the last experiment, we apply the testing engine in
SOCRATES to test the local robustness of 10000 sample
in the MNIST challenge. With the setting θ = 0.90, the
engine accepts H0 9760 times and accept H1 93 times. With
θ = 0.95, H0 is accepted 9724 times and H1 129 times. These
numbers are 9657 and 196 respectively for θ = 0.99. Again,
we can see that the number of times H0 is accepted decreases
when the value of θ increases. In the experiment, the engine
generates more than 2.6 million samples for θ = 0.90, and
more than 2.8 million samples for θ = 0.95 and 0.99. The time
needed to run the experiment is 4h38m, 4h51m, and 4h54m
for θ = 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 respectively.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review existing approaches on
verification and falsification of neural networks and discuss
how our approach is different.
This work is closely related to existing approaches on
verifying local robustness of neural networks. Ever since the
discovery of adversarial samples [39], the problem of verifying
robustness of neural networks attracted much attentions due
to their implications in safety critical applications. Existing
approaches can be roughly classified into two groups: exact
methods and approximation methods.
The exact methods aim to capture semantics of neural
networks precisely and solve the verification problem through
constraint solving. In [40], Tjeng et al. proposed to tackle the
problem using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP).
In [10], [41], the authors proposed to solve the problem
through SMT solving. These methods can verify a neural
network as long as the property holds. The limitations of these
methods are that they are limited to analyze (feedforward)
neural networks with ReLU activation functions only. In other
words, popular activation functions such as Sigmoid and Tanh
are not supported. Furthermore, these methods typically have
limited scalability, i.e., they can only handle networks with a
small number of layers and neurons, as we partly demonstrate
in Section IV-B.
The approximation methods leverage well-developed tech-
niques such as linear approximations [42], [43] and abstract
interpretation [13], [14], [15]. The idea is to conduct an
over-approximation of the given neural network (e.g., through
over-approximating each neuron with a simple linear con-
straint), and verify properties soundly based on the over-
approximation. Thanks to the linear approximation, these
approaches (although not all of them) could handle a wider
range of activation function such as ReLU, Sigmoid or Tanh.
Furthermore, these approaches are typically more scalable
than the exact methods. As a price to pay, due to the over-
approximation, these methods are sound but not complete, i.e.,
they may fail to verify a valid property due to the presence of
the so-called spurious counterexamples.
Our project does not aim to replace these impressive efforts.
Rather, we aim to provide a platform which integrates and
further develops these efforts. Furthermore, the two new ver-
ification engines supported in SOCRATES are complementary
to existing verification approaches, i.e., the falsification engine
would allow us to efficiently falsify those properties which
are not satisfied whereas the SMC engine provides a way of
verifying neural network probabilistically.
Beside robustness, this work is related to a line of work
on analyzing fairness of neural networks, collectively called
fairness testing. Several approaches have been proposed on
fairness testing machine learning models including neural
networks. All of them search for discriminatory instances (i.e.,
counterexamples to fairness) through certain heuristic-based
sampling techniques. Galhotra et al. proposed THEMIS [44],
[45], a causality based algorithm utilizing the random test
generation to evaluate a model’s fairness, i.e., the frequency
of individual discriminatory instances. Their work could be
viewed as a heuristic-based approach for statistical model
checking of fairness. Udeshi et al. proposed AEQUITAS [46]
which is based on THEMIS. AEQUITAS works in two phases,
i.e., a ‘global search’ phase, which attempts to explore the
whole input domain, followed by a ‘local search’ phase, which
searches within the neighboring region of the instances iden-
tified in the global phase. Zhang et al. proposes a lightweight
algorithm ADF to efficiently generate individual discrimina-
tory instances [9]. They perturb instances near the decision
boundary in the global search and leverage the gradient
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Prop. Networks #Tasks θ = 0.90 θ = 0.95 θ = 0.99H0 H1 Time H0 H1 Time H0 H1 Time
P1 [10] ACASXU_*_* (all networks) 45 45 0 30s 45 0 30s 45 0 30s
P2 [10] ACASXU_x_* (x ≥ 2) 36 36 0 24s 36 0 24s 14 22 24s
P3 [10] ACASXU_*_* 6= (1_{7, 8, 9}) 42 42 0 28s 42 0 28s 42 0 28s
P4 [10] ACASXU_*_* 6= (1_{7, 8, 9}) 42 42 0 28s 42 0 28s 42 0 28s
P5 [10] ACASXU_1_1 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
P6 [10] ACASXU_1_1 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
P7 [10] ACASXU_1_9 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
P8 [10] ACASXU_2_9 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
P9 [10] ACASXU_3_3 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
P10 [10] ACASXU_4_5 1 1 0 1s 1 0 1s 1 0 1s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_4_1024 98 96 2 26s 96 2 26s 95 3 27s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_6_100 99 99 0 7s 99 0 7s 99 0 7s
Robust. MNIST_ReLU_9_200 97 93 4 10s 92 5 10s 90 7 9s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500 95 93 2 17s 93 2 18s 92 3 19s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500_PGD_0.1 100 98 2 18s 98 2 19s 98 2 19s
Robust. MNIST_Sigmoid_6_500_PGD_0.3 97 96 1 18s 96 1 19s 96 1 19s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500 99 98 1 17s 98 1 18s 97 2 18s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500_PGD_0.1 100 100 0 18s 100 0 18s 100 0 19s
Robust. MNIST_Tanh_6_500_PGD_0.3 100 99 1 19s 99 1 18s 99 1 19s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU 100 100 0 28s 99 1 29s 99 1 29s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU_DAI 99 99 0 27s 99 0 28s 99 0 30s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Small_ReLU_PGD 100 100 0 27s 100 0 29s 100 0 29s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Big_ReLU_DAI 95 95 0 2m33s 95 0 2m41s 95 0 2m47s
Robust. MNIST_Conv_Super_ReLU_DAI 99 99 0 8m30s 98 1 8m55s 98 1 9m3s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_6_100 16 7 9 6s 7 9 6s 7 9 6s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_7_1024 16 10 6 43s 10 6 41s 8 8 39s
Robust. CIFAR_ReLU_9_200 9 7 2 9s 5 4 8s 5 4 8s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU 59 52 7 27s 49 10 30s 45 14 24s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU_DAI 53 50 3 31s 49 4 24s 47 6 24s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Small_ReLU_PGD 70 64 6 38s 64 6 30s 63 7 29s
Robust. CIFAR_Conv_Big_ReLU_DAI 60 53 7 2m53s 52 8 2m47s 48 12 2m9s
Robust. Jigsaw_GRU 94 91 3 4m 90 4 4m20s 88 6 5m15s
Robust. Jigsaw_LSTM 93 93 0 4m25s 93 0 4m43s 92 1 5m18s
Robust. Wiki_GRU 96 96 0 4m49s 96 0 4m54s 96 0 5m10s
Robust. Wiki_LSTM 94 93 1 5m27s 92 2 5m37s 92 2 5m40s
Fairness Bank_MLP_6_Layers 99 91 8 2s 89 10 3s 87 12 2s
Fairness Census_MLP_6_Layers 86 61 25 2s 56 30 3s 45 41 2s
Fairness Credit_MLP_6_Layers 100 64 36 3s 56 44 2s 51 49 2s
Total 73 networks 2494 2368 126 41m6s 2341 153 42m19s 2280 214 43m38s
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENT WITH STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING
information to guide the local search.
We note that existing approaches focuses on testing of
fairness rather than fairness verification. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first attempt to support fairness verifi-
cation on neural networks.
The falsification engine in SOCRATES is inspired by the
many adversarial sample generation methods. Since Szegedy
et al. discovered that neural networks are vulnerable to adver-
sarial samples [39], many attacking methods have been devel-
oped to generate adversarial samples efficiently with minimal
perturbation. Some examples are the FGSM method [39], the
Jacobian-based saliency map attack [47], and C&W [8]. Lastly,
this work is remotely related to recent papers which proposed
different coverage criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a
test set, along with different methods to generate test cases to
improve the coverage criteria. For instance, DeepXplore [48]
proposed the first testing criterion for DNN models, i.e.,
Neuron Coverage (NC), which calculates the percentage of
activated neurons (w.r.t. an activation function) among all neu-
rons. Unlike the above-mentioned work, this project focuses
on verification of neural networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we aim to develop a unified platform for neural
network verification. Towards our goal, we make three techni-
cal contributions. First, we propose a unified JSON format for
capturing a variety of neural network models as well as an as-
sertion language for specifying neural network properties. We
further build a repository of 12347 verification tasks, which
serves as a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating neural
network verification techniques. Second, we develop two novel
algorithms for tackling the verification problems for a variety
of models and properties. The experiment results show that
these two algorithms complement existing approaches. Lastly,
we devote non-trivial amount of engineering effort to make
our project a useful open source platform.
We are continuously developing our platform further as
the following activities: integrating all existing verification
algorithms, extending them with further optimizations (such
as abstraction refinement for existing abstraction interpretation
based approaches) and developing new algorithms (such as
probabilistic model checking for neural networks).
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